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Carving Out Space for Aristotle’s Megalopsychos
Susanna McGrew, Swarthmore College
The megalopsychos

[1]

is the most reviled of Aristotle’s virtuous characters today, but he

was a paragon of virtue in the 4th century BCE. Other virtues that Aristotle praised such
as courage, generosity, and temperance are still recognized as excellent and worthy of
striving to reach. A megalopsychos is deﬁned simply as someone “who thinks himself
[2]
worthy of great things and is worthy of them” (1123b2-3), though what exactly it
means to be worthy of great things is open to some interpretation. Although Aristotle
draws his portrait against the backdrop of Ancient Athens, where some groups of
people were accepted as categorically inferior to others, nothing in this deﬁnition
requires that the megalopsychos can only exist in such a society. Alasdair MacIntyre
points to Aristotle’s complacency with his social order and suggests that “it is perhaps
[3]
no accident he also believes that some men are slaves by nature.” If we reject what
Aristotle says about natural slaves, we should also be able to reject other inequalities in
the social context he describes without having to reject his valuable insights about
virtue. For the virtue of megalopsychia to have relevance today, it is not necessary that we
accept it in the same form that Aristotle endorsed over two thousand years ago. If the
deﬁning features of megalopsychia – greatness and correct self-evaluation of greatness –
are still useful concepts, then megalopsychia is still worth thinking about.
Most modern critics, however, would deny that the deﬁning features of megalopsychia
are useful to us. Nancy Sherman and Alasdair MacIntyre, in particular, argue that there
is no place for the megalopsychos today because he is exempt from ordinary morality and
[4]
because he essentially belongs to a society of unequals. We have strong reasons for
wanting people in our community to share our conceptions of morality and (even more
importantly) not to want them to undermine the state of equality that we strive to reach.
If megalopsychia implied either of those things, we could reasonably consider it a vice. In
response to Sherman and MacIntyre, I will argue that we can carve out space for the
virtue of the megalopsychos today by diﬀusing the objections that he is exempt from
ordinary morality and that he belongs only to a society of unequals. Far from it being an
obsolete virtue that we should now shun, I will argue that we should instead embrace
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megalopsychia as an admirable contemporary virtue that still has much to teach us about
reaching toward the good and about self-understanding.
I.
Objection: the megalopsychos is exempt from ordinary morality
Let us assume that someone who considers himself exempt from ordinary morality is
unattractive because he undermines our conﬁdence in our own morality, he cannot be
relied upon to do “the right thing,” and we have diﬃculty relating to him. An
interpretation of the megalopsychos as exempt from ordinary morality, I will suggest,
rests on a misunderstanding of what motivates him, namely that he is more moved by
personal honor (which, let us assume, is not a permissible motivation under ordinary
morality) than by good (which is). On my view the megalopsychos is correctly
understood as motivated by the good; this objection is therefore not compelling. I do
not spell out what ordinary morality is exactly but assume that there is such a thing that
most people would not reasonably object to. Various conceptions of the good ﬁt into
ordinary morality and my argument does not rest on a speciﬁc account of it.
The objection is clearly articulated by Nancy Sherman, who contends that “acting from
[5]
grand scale virtues exempts an agent from ordinary moral service.” Her criticism is
similar to others that Howard Curzer responds to, including that the megalopsychos is
ungrateful and manipulative; inactive and remote; self-absorbed; and unsympathetic,
[6]
inaccessible, and insuﬃciently benevolent. Sherman’s primary evidence that the
megalopsychos is exempt is Aristotle’s comment that, “it is characteristic of the
[megalopsychos] not to aim at things commonly held in honor, or the things in which
others excel; to be sluggish and hold back except where great honor or great work is at
stake, and to be a man of few deeds, but of great and noble ones” (1124b13-15). To
Sherman, his infrequent performance of great actions is an excuse for the megalopsychos
[7]
to neglect “ongoing and persistent concern for the welfare of others” and instead
focus on actions that will bring him the greatest honor. For Sherman, the megalopsychos’
grand actions are inherently motivated by his desire to be honored. She characterizes
him as of “the sort that typically reap honor, that will beﬁt his position and importance.
He does not easily surrender moments for such display.” As a result, “the scope of his
desire to help is restricted” by his desire for opportunities to act in ways that will bring
[8]
him honor.
While it is true that the megalopsychos, as Aristotle describes him, is particularly
concerned with honor (1123b16 and 1124a13), Sherman is mistaken about the form of
that concern. Far from being a motivation, honor and external recognition are merely
eﬀects of being good; he wants honor only as conﬁrmation of his goodness. He pursues
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the good because he just is good (it would be an “utter absurdity” for him not to be
good (1123b34)), not because the rewards that follow from pursuing the good (such as
being honored) are independently pleasant. Aristotle is careful to mention that the
megalopsychos does not consider honor to be “a very great thing” (1124a18). He merely
accepts it as his just desert, being pleased when it comes from sources that he considers
capable of recognizing honor (“good men”) and unmoved when it comes from those he
deems incapable of recognizing it (“casual people”) (1123b18 and 1124a10-13). If the
megalopsychos’ focus on actions that will bring him honor is interpreted as a focus on the
actions that aim at the greatest good rather than on those that are most rewarded, then
his motivation is no longer outside the scope of ordinary morality. A careful reading of
Aristotle’s description of the megalopsychos suggests that he is better understood as
motivated by the good than by personal honor.
Translations may aﬀect our reading of what seems to motivate the megalopsychos. For
[9]
[10]
example, the word kataphronei is roughly “looking down” in English.
Michael
Pakaluk translates it as, “Because the great-hearted man shows contempt, with
[11]
justiﬁcation, since he has a true assessment of things,”
while Christian Rowe
translates, “For the great-souled person is justiﬁed in looking down on people (since his
[12]
judgements are true).”
Because, as Pakaluk notes, kataphronei does not have a
grammatical object in Greek, one can kataphronei without doing so to speciﬁc
[13]
individuals.
Rowe’s translation suggests that the megalopsychos is thought here
essentially comparative, while Pakaluk’s does not. Another example is hyperechein, from
hyper (more) and echo (to have). David Ross translates that “the proud man wishes to be
[14]
superior,”
while Pakaluk renders, “the point is to excel.” Pakaluk comments that
hyperechein “is not meant to imply comparison with others;” it means “to excel over
oneself: to do something, obviously available to you, that would make your doing the
other alternative presenting itself to you–perhaps the easier alternative–look to be
[15]
something inferior.”
The word “superior” again brings in an element of comparison
that Aristotle may not have intended and suggests what I suspect is an inappropriate
self-centeredness. These modern connotations might make us view megalopsychia in
ways Aristotle did not intend.
Turning to the text, Aristotle deﬁnes the megalopsychos as a person “who thinks himself
worthy of great things and is worthy of them” (1123b2). Greatness is not categorically
diﬀerent from goodness but is rather a great quantity of goodness – possessing very
many good virtues and possessing them to a high degree. Given the textual context,
Curzer suggests that those great things are “the external goods (wealth, power, beauty,
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honor, etc.).”

[16]

This deﬁnition is puzzling because the megalopsychos is supposed to be

above caring about external goods, which are only instrumentally rather than
intrinsically good: he will “bear himself with moderation towards wealth and power
and all good or evil fortune, whatever may befall him, and will be neither overjoyed by
good fortune nor over-pained by evil” (1124a14-17). In fact, Aristotle suggests that
having great things is only meaningful when it reﬂects being honored: “Everything that
has a superiority in good is held in greater honor… but in truth the good man alone is to
be honored” (1124a23). Similarly, being honored is only important insofar as it is a
marker of being virtuous: although individuals with great wealth will be honored by
some, “those who without virtue have such goods are neither justiﬁed in making great
claims nor entitled to the name of ‘[megalopsychos]’; for these things imply perfect
virtue” (1124a26-29). What is really at issue with the greatness of the megalopsychos is
that he himself must be good. My argument is that the material goods part, though part
[17]
of how Aristotle deﬁnes the virtue, is not essential
. Rather, it points to something
essential to the virtue: goodness and possession of other virtues. This interpretation is
supported by Aristotle’s explicit statement that “the truly [megalopsychos] must be good.
And greatness in every virtue would seem to be characteristic of a [megalopsychos]”
(1123b29).
Aristotle uses external goods in his deﬁnition to mean the same thing as goodness
because in his society external goods, virtue, and honor were all connected. He observes
that, “men who are well-born are thought worthy of honor, and so are those who enjoy
power or wealth; for they are in a superior position, and everything that has a
superiority in some good is held in greater honor” (1124a23). But Aristotle subsequently
undermines the validity of this connection in claiming that “in truth the good man
alone is to be honored” and “those who without virtue have such goods are neither
justiﬁed in making great claims nor entitled to the name of [megalopsychos]; for these
things imply perfect virtue” (1124a24-29). His ﬁrst claim that virtue and honor are
connected reﬂects the social conventions he observed, while the second claim that only
the good man should be honored reﬂects philosophical reasoning about the
implications of virtue. In response to the tension between the two claims, it makes sense
to reject the ﬁrst in favor of the second. The second follows from reasoning about what
virtue is, while the ﬁrst is only correct in a certain social context.
Interpretations like Sherman’s likely result from overlooking the important distinction
between being honored and being worthy of honor. Only the latter is important for the
megalopsychos, although the connection between external goods and honor depends on
the former. Nor is being worthy of honor important in itself. Megalopsychoi care about
being worthy of honor because it is an indication of what they really care about, being
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virtuous: “honor is the prize of virtue, and it is to the good that it is rendered,”
(1123b35) and “not even toward honor does [the megalopsychos] bear himself as if it were
a very great thing” (1124a17). Aristotle concludes that “power and wealth are desirable
for the sake of honor” (1124a18) and separately seems to recognize that honor is
desirable only insofar as it indicates being virtuous. Being worthy of great things (such
as power and wealth) is therefore desirable because it indicates being virtuous, which is,
after all, what the truly good person aims at. A deﬁning feature of the megalopsychos is
not that he is, and knows he is, worthy of great external goods, but rather that he is, and
knows he is, virtuous. I will take up the question of what makes megalopsychia a distinct
virtue in the ﬁnal section.
We might question Aristotle’s claim that “it makes no diﬀerence whether we consider
the state of the character or the man characterized by it” (1123b1). The state of the
character describes what is essential about the megalopsychos, while the man
characterized by it is the product of that character living in a speciﬁc society. If Aristotle
only considers the megalopsychos in his own society, his conﬂation of being honored with
being worthy of honor is not hugely consequential. But I aim to consider the modern
megalopsychos, removed from Aristotle’s context. It makes a diﬀerence to that endeavor
whether I consider the character itself or the (socially placed) man characterized by it.
Let us assume that people today do not accord honor on the basis of power and wealth
in the same way (in fact, we sometimes think powerful and wealthy people are more
likely than average to be morally corrupt), so the goods-honor connection is lost. From
my interpretation of Aristotle’s text, virtue (part of pursuit the good) is the
megalopsychos’ motivation, not personal honor. Thinking that the megalopsychos is
motivated by honor implies a connection between honor, goodness and virtue, that we
may no longer consider valid.
If he is not motivated by personal honor, then there is little textual evidence to support
the idea that the megalopsychos considers himself exempt from the demands of ordinary
morality. As noted above, he will “be a man of few deeds, but of great and noble ones”
(1124b25). As such, he is willing to face great dangers for the sake of important things,
but not willing to undertake “triﬂing” dangers for the sake of less important things
(1124b8). He may perform acts that are greater than what we typically do in our
everyday lives (he may end up risking his life for the sake of justice, for example,
because his acts that are more purely motivated by consideration of the good than by
personal concerns ), but that does not entail that he is acting on a diﬀerent morality.
That he chooses to act on moral considerations even when there is much at stake instead
of only when the risks to acting morally are triﬂing does not mean that he adheres to a
morality that disregards the welfare of other people as trivial, or that he uses his great
acts as an excuse for not performing more trivial acts. As even Sherman recognizes, we
cannot help everyone. We must discriminate between possible actions. Her concern is
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that the megalopsychos makes those discriminations on the basis of the wrong reasons
and motivations. I have argued that there is no reason to think that he does. If
discriminations are made on the basis of what will be the most good rather than on the
basis of considering other people unimportant or a reﬂection of what will bring him the
most prestige, then it is not inconsistent with ordinary morality that the megalopsychos
may act in ways that other people recognize as good and for which they may even
honor him.
II.
Objection: the megalopsychos is “essentially a member of a society of
unequals”
Being incompatible with a society of equals is an even more troubling objection for the
megalopsychos. If he is essentially a member of a society of unequals, then the
megalopsychos’s existence in our society suggests that our society is not and cannot be a
society of equals. Alasdair MacIntyre makes this objection by arguing that the
megalopsychos is “essentially a member of a society of unequals” because his
“characteristic attitudes require a society of superiors and inferiors in which he can
[18]
exhibit his peculiar brand of condescension.”
In the society in which Aristotle ﬁnds
himself, it is certainly true that the megalopsychos acts on the recognition that certain
others are inferior to him. But for this objection to be compelling, it needs to explain
why inequality is bad and what it means to be equals in society. MacIntyre’s objection
does not spell out either. Set against an account of equality that locates the harm of
inequality as standing in the way of the kind of human relationships that are necessary
to ﬂourishing and that deﬁnes equality as relational political equality, I would suggest
that the speciﬁc inequality in goodness that the megalopsychos is essentially part of does
not cause the harmful kind of political relational inequality that obstructs human
ﬂourishing. In other words, the megalopsychos is not essentially a member of a society of
relational political unequals, so the thought that he might be essentially a part of
inequality in something else, like goodness, is not troubling.
A possible response to MacIntyre’s objection is to argue that while some of the attitudes
that Aristotle attributes to the megalopsychos can only exist in a society of unequals,
those “characteristic attitudes” are not deﬁning character traits. Rather, they are
characteristics of the megalopsychos in the speciﬁc society in which he is described. These
attitudes include despising honors oﬀered by common people, not caring to conceal his
opinion because he has a poor opinion of others, and always repaying beneﬁts with
interest so as to remain in the position of a benefactor. Someone who possesses
megalopsychia (understood as being good and knowing that he is good) in a diﬀerent
society that lacks relations of superiority would not share those same attitudes.
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This line of argument can at most show that the megalopsychos can exist in some
particular idealized society. I would like to suggest that he can exist in our society. To
support that claim, I must argue that he is compatible with the speciﬁc type of equality
that might be said to (ideally) characterize our society. Consider one conception of
relational political equality along the lines of Elizabeth Anderson’s conception of
[19]
democratic equality.
She argues that egalitarians seek to live in a democratic (rather
than hierarchical) society where people are collectively self-determined through open
discussion among equals and governed by rules acceptable to all. People stand in
equality to each other through discussion: each member of society is entitled to
[20]
participate,
other members recognize an obligation to listen and respond
respectfully, and nobody need represent themselves as inferior to make their claims
heard. For Anderson, equality is essentially relational and ensures fair treatment in the
political process. This theory is attractive because it aﬃrms that all people have worth
and have a voice, while still allowing that they may diﬀer substantially in their talents,
virtues, and other individual characteristics. Traits that we intuitively think have moral
signiﬁcance, such as kindness and generosity, may indeed have moral importance
elsewhere, but they are not relevant to this form of equality.
At the same time, political relational equality captures what is most harmful about
inequality. Samuel Scheﬄer suggests that we ﬁnd equality valuable “because we believe
that there is something valuable about human relationships that are, in certain crucial
[21]
respects at least, unstructured by diﬀerences in rank, power, or status.”
If every
citizen relates to one another as an equal citizen with an equal right to participate in
political deliberation (regardless of whether she exercise that right), then this
unstructured relationship will necessarily exist between every person in society, at least
in an important political sense. One account of human ﬂourishing takes living
collaboratively with others as necessary to reach one’s full potential. If humans are by
nature social and if we need to live free from stiﬂing relationships to fully engage
socially, then the kind of inequalities that prevent our forming unstructured
relationships also prevent our human ﬂourishing. Political institutions inﬂuence much
of our social interactions. Patterns of political privilege and deference therefore color
much of our personal relationships, too. Privilege and deference undermine the
self-respect of those in the inferior position and inﬂate the others’ sense of superiority in
a way that corrupts their mutual human relationships and prevents those in the inferior
position from recognizing and fulﬁlling their own full potential. A regime of equality
under which every citizen relates to each other as at least equally entitled to participate
in political deliberations creates a buﬀer against the harmful inequalities that
undermine self-respect and prevent ﬂourishing.
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A more interesting response to MacIntyre’s objection about the megalopsychos’ essential
incompatibility with a society of equals that is sensitive to the sketch of equality given
above argues that the objection only looks concerning because the terms “superior”,
“inferior”, and “equals” are left unspeciﬁed. Inequality, with its inherent relations of
inferiority and superiority, only becomes a problem when it undermines people’s
relational standings of political equality, that is, when it results in certain people being
excluded from political discussions because they are not entitled to participate and
others do not recognize a responsibility to listen respectfully. On the view that I am
considering, recognition that some people do while others do not possess megalopsychia
does not aﬀect individuals’ standing to participate in the deliberative process.
Superiority in goodness is not relevant to and therefore does not undermine one’s
ability to contribute to that process. And because it does not undermine one’s ability to
participate in the process, it should not aﬀect the how individuals are listened to in
democratic deliberations either.
As grounds for being excluded from political discussion, Anderson speciﬁes
[22]
“communicative incompetence” and unwillingness to participate respectfully.
There
is nothing essential to inequalities in virtue that means that they must lead to political
relational inequality. It is certainly a problem if less virtuous people happen to be
treated disrespectfully in political deliberations even though they are perfectly qualiﬁed
to participate – if their comparatively lesser virtue is used as a reason to discriminate
against them. But that would be the reﬂection of a greater problem in that society, not a
direct consequence of the existence of megalopsychia. Megalopsychia does not depend on
or in itself necessarily cause political disrespect.
However, it might still be a problem that the megalopsychos “is given to telling the truth,
except when he speaks in irony to the vulgar” (1124b30-31). Hiding the truth from
someone, even if telling the truth would be “as vulgar as a display of strength against
the weak” (1124b23) assumes that someone is not worthy of the truth. In a political
deliberation, withholding it from someone does not respect that person as capable of
dealing with the truth and thereby of fully participating in communal deliberation. The
excuse that the megalopsychos acts in this way to spare the feelings of the less virtuous
person is not enough to justify the action. In practice, the megalopsychos’ tendency to be
“unassuming towards those of the middle class” (1124b19) and not to call attention to
his superiority may partially oﬀset the eﬀects of his disrespect, but it cannot obviate it
completely. Even if possible disrespectful deception about the megalopsychos’ superiority
is an open issue, specifying the relevant kind of equality as political relational inequality
signiﬁcantly limits how much of a problem the existence of a megalopsychos can pose in
what would otherwise be a society of equals. It thus takes away much of the force of the
objection that the megalopsychos is essentially incompatible with a society of equals.
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III.
What we can learn from the megalopsychos
Megalopsychia is unique among Aristotle’s other virtues in not relating directly to how
people act. Unlike courage, temperance, and generosity, which are distinguished by
courageous, temperate, and generous acts performed from the corresponding
dispositions, megalopsychia is distinguished by possession of the other virtues to a great
degree. Aristotle likens megalopsychia to an ornament that decorates goodness but
cannot cause it, describing it as “a sort of crown of the virtues; for it makes them greater
and is not found without them” (1124a1). The megalopsychos is good in the same kinds of
ways that people who possess other virtues are good, but he is diﬀerent in the extent of
his virtues and because he possesses so many at once. He is properly called great, not
simply good, because his goodness is on a scale large enough to distinguish it from
ordinary goodness. He is not concerned to “aim at the things commonly held in honor”
but instead acts in situations where “great work is at stake” (1124b24). The eﬀect of his
lofty aims is that he does things that ordinary people would not do – he may be a
visionary who undertakes projects so important and far-reaching that they have
resounding social beneﬁts or change a society’s trajectory. Curzer likens the
megalopsychos to a Homeric hero and suggests that they are uncommon enough for most
[23]
of us not to know any.
He is the kind of epic ﬁgure that should be admired, not
admonished, in his rare instantiations. The rarity of megalopsychia does not diminish its
importance in contemporary thought, however. Even those of us who are not ourselves
great can learn from the megalopsychos. In particular, we can strive to emulate his
motivation from the good and his self-understanding of particular goodness.
The part of megalopsychia that reaches for the good (through aiming at virtue) models a
view about coincident self-improvement through striving for the good that has fallen
out of fashion. For the megalopsychos, reaching for the good is a worthy individual
pursuit, not a way to display superiority over others. The fact that reaching for the good
is an individual pursuit initially comes oﬀ as uncomfortably self-absorbed in a world
where we are more used to following an ethics of duty that more explicitly refers to
other people. But the self-improvement that megalopsychia advocates is not actually
motivated by the self. It is motivated by the sake of the good, which exists beyond the
self. Just as honor may come as a coincident eﬀect of being good, the self coincidentally
will be improved through striving for the good. Acting as a megalopsychos will also
coincidentally beneﬁt other people: as a consequence of acting courageously or being a
better friend (both are ways of pursuing the good), one will end up performing many of
the same actions required by duties to other people. Megalopsychia gives us a model of
acting for the sake of the good that encourages us to reﬂect and understand what the
good is, rather than more simply acting within the set constraints of duty. It does result
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in self-improvement, but through a reorientation toward the sake of the good and away
from what is demanded by morality of every individual.
Thinking about megalopsychia as seeking the good also reminds us that being good and
seeking self-improvement need not be comparative or competitive. While megalopsychia
is a virtue, its absence is not a vice. Megalopsychia is good in that it “makes [the other
virtues] greater” (1125a25) and encourages worthy people to strive to meet their full
potential (1125a25-30). But the vain and the unduly humble (the respective vices of
over- and under-evaluation of greatness) who lack megalopsychia “are not thought to be
bad (for they are not evildoers) but only mistaken” (1125a18). Lacking megalopsychia is
not enough to mark one as a bad person. There is an asymmetry: while it is a positive
thing to possess more megalopsychia, it is not a deeply negative thing to possess less of it.
There is no threshold above which one is “good,” and below which one is “bad.”
Rather, embracing megalopsychia means embarking on a continual quest for
improvement through reaching closer to the good. This approach has the advantage
over more conventional ways of thinking about duties and obligations that by being less
prescriptive, it is less stressful and punitive and encourages people to never settle as
having completed their duties.
The megalopsychos’ self-understanding of his goodness oﬀers another important lesson
about setting appropriate aspirations. Being unduly humble, far from being a virtue,
actually makes a person worse. Aristotle asserts that “each class of people aims at what
corresponds to its worth,” (1125a25) (or at least what it thinks to be its worth). Someone
who does not recognize that he is worthy of good things sets inappropriately low goals
and thereby “robs himself of what he deserves” (1125a20). Conversely, vain people with
an inﬂated sense of self attempt inappropriately grand actions “and then are found out”
(1125a30). The megalopsychos, in contrast, accurately assesses his great worth and so sets
ambitious goals that he is able to meet. The megalopsychos teaches us to develop an
awareness of our own capabilities: set our aspirations too low and we will not meet our
full potential; but set out aspirations too high and we will be exposed as unworthy of
them. While not everyone can be a megalopsychos because not everyone is good in the
highest degree, everyone can nonetheless understand her own goodness and act in
accordance with it.
Despite Aristotle’s praise of them as “good in the highest degree” (1123b27),
megalopsychoi are not perfect. They are excessively concerned with their relationships to
others, which makes them “seem also to remember any service they have done, but not
those they have received (for he who receives a service is inferior to him who has done
it, and the proud man wishes to be superior)” (1124b13). Their peculiar forgetfulness
comes from being ashamed to admit inferiority to one’s benefactor and stands in the
way of complete self-knowledge. Unlike the megalopsychos, we should be appropriately
humble to recognize our own shortcomings and not allow concern with self-image to

EPISTEME XXXI 54

eclipse self-understanding. Although he has faults, such as hiding his goodness to those
he deems less good and allowing his shame partly to cloud his self-understanding, he is
not nearly as unappealing as objections that he is exempt from ordinary morality and
that he is essentially of a society of unequals might initially make him seem. But despite
his ﬂaws, he is uniquely able to perform grand-scale acts of goodness. That and his
devotion to the good for the sake of the good rather than for self-serving reasons, his
compatibility with a noncompetitive view of morality, and his highly developed if
imperfect self-understanding are enough to make him admirable in many respects. We
would be better oﬀ today if we embraced the positive lessons that we can learn from the
megalopsychos instead of rejecting everything about him because his superiority in virtue
initially makes us uncomfortable.
Notes
[1]

No word in English precisely describes the character Aristotle describes. Various authors have

suggested such “proud”, “magnanimous”, “great-hearted”, and “great-souled”, but I follow Curzer in
leaving the term untranslated rather than use a translation that carries irrelevant or inappropriate
connotations.
[2]
Line numbers refer to Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics trans. David Ross (New York: Oxford University
Press 2009).
[3]

Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 79.

[4]

MacIntyre and Nancy Sherman, “Common Sense and Uncommon Virtue,” Midwest Studies in

Philosophy 13 (1998)
[5]
Sherman 103.

[6]

Howard Curzer, “Aristotle’s Much Maligned Megalopsychos,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69, no.

2 (1991): 134, 138, and 142
[7]
Sherman 105

[8]
[9]

Sherman 111
At 1124b4-6, in discussion of diﬀerences between the truly and only apparently megalopsychos

[10]
[11]

Etymology information primarily from Wiktionary and other online Greek dictionaries.
Michael Pakaluk, “The Meaning of Aristotelian Magnanimity,” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy

36, ed. David Sedley (2004): 251.
[12]
Christian Rowe, quoted in Pakaluk 264

[13]
[14]
[15]

Pakaluk 264
1124b10
Pakaluk 270-271
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[17]

Curzer 132
Although if it were, it would follow that the extent to which megalopsychia is important for social

relationships depends in part on how important it is to have great things. I could probably take a diﬀerent
approach, focusing on external goods, and still conclude that the megalopsychos can live in a society of
equals so long as material goods do not inﬂuence people’s standing in relations of equality to each other.
[18]
MacIntyre 78

[19]
[20]

Elizabeth Anderson, “What Is the Point of Equality?” Ethics 109, no. 2 (1992): 313.
Everyone is entitled to be listened to respectfully at least until they prove themselves incapable of

participating. Nobody can be ruled incapable without ﬁrst being given a fair hearing.
[21]
Samuel Scheﬄer, “Choice, circumstance, and the value of equality,” Politics, Philosophy and Economics
4, no. 1 (2005): 17
[22]
Anderson 313

[23]

Curzer 150
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